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We analyze motivations for, and possible alternatives to, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
With regard to the former, we identify domestic policy failures and various cross-country 
spillover effects; with regard to the latter, we contrast an “economic-theory" perspective on 
optimal corrective measures with the “legalistic" perspective adopted in the SGP. We discuss 
the advantages of replacing the Pact's rigid rules backed by fines with corrective taxes (as far 
as spillover effects are concerned) and procedural rules and limited delegation of fiscal 
powers (as far as domestic policy failures are concerned). This would not only enhance the 
efficiency of the Pact, but also render it easier to enforce. 
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The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of EMU is an attempt at letting internationally agreed
arrangements compensate for inadequate incentives of national ¯scal policy makers, as re°ected
in cross-country spillover e®ects or domestic policy failures. As dramatically illustrated by the
contemporary problems of implementing the SGP, such arrangements may be in con°ict with
the pursuit of other national policy targets, for instance ambitions to dampen the business cycle,
smooth tax distortions, or ¯ght unemployment. In fact, a large early literature predicted that
such con°icts had to arise at some point. What is less clear, however, is whether revisions of
the SGP, or alternatives to the Pact, can mitigate these con°icts, and what such revisions or
alternatives might be. These questions are at the core of this paper.
From an economic-theory perspective, the most appealing response to spillover e®ects is a
system of corrective taxes. By internalizing the consequences of spillovers, such a system en-
sures an optimal trade-o® between national policy targets on the one hand and the ambition
to correct spillovers on the other. The SGP, in contrast, largely re°ects a legalistic perspective
according to which policies causing unfavorable spillover e®ects should be forbidden and viola-
tions punished. We argue in this paper that this legalistic view constitutes the background for
important de¯ciencies of the SGP, related to its suboptimal incentive structure and di±culties
in enforcing its rules. Naturally, an ideal set of corrective taxes is hardly operational, due to the
lack of precise quantitative information about the economic environment and domestic policy
failure. But a simple corrective tax system may be feasible, and the SGP therefore o®ers room
for improvement.
In contrast to spillover e®ects, domestic policy failure can only partially be addressed by
corrective taxes (unless politicians themselves can be taxed). Direct constraints on policy makers
constitute an alternative. Such constraints are costly, since they imply a loss of policy °exibility.
We share the rather common view that the rigid rules embodied in the SGP are excessively
costly, since they impose unnecessarily tight restrictions. While several proposed reforms of the
SGP imply some improvements in that respect, they do not resolve the fundamental con°ict
between policy °exibility and the ambition to counteract policy failures. Limited delegation
of ¯scal powers to fully accountable committees, in contrast, does o®er a conceivable solution.
A priori, neither delegation nor other measures to address domestic policy failure need to be
imposed on the supranational level. Nevertheless, supranationally imposed measures could be
in a country's best interest, if domestic policy failure extends to the constitutional level.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we compare the incentives
of ¯scal policy makers before and after the emergence of EMU. We identify potential problems
with ¯scal policy choices in EMU, related to spillover e®ects as well as policy failures. In
the former case, we distinguish between cross-country redistributions of income, international
demand externalities, and strategic interaction among policy makers. In Section 3, we discuss
alternative arrangements to address spillover e®ects and policy failures, and mechanisms for
enforcing such arrangements. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains a formal discussion
of the framework underlying the analysis in Section 2.
22 Fiscal-Monetary Policy Interaction
Our objective in this section is to characterize the problems arising as a result of decentralized
¯scal policies in a world with interdependent national economies. For this purpose, we consider
the situation in Europe both before and after the introduction of the common monetary policy.
For analytical reasons, we also compare these situations to a hypothetical \Nirvana" benchmark
of fully coordinated policy actions. Such comparisons allow us to identify whether the intro-
duction of the monetary union did create new problems, or rather accentuated already existing
problems.
In the following, we refer to these three scenarios as \EU" (the situation in the European
Union before the introduction of the monetary union), \EMU" (the situation in the European
Union after the introduction of the monetary union), and \benchmark" (the situation with
\ideally" coordinated policy choices). Our discussion is based on a formal characterization of
the incentive structure of policy agents in the benchmark, EU, and EMU as presented in the
Appendix.
2.1 Benchmark: Perfect Policy Coordination
The benchmark re°ects the case of fully coordinated decision making by all ¯scal and monetary
authorities, aiming at maximizing some agreed-upon joint objective function subject to optimiz-
ing household behavior. Such international policy coordination may appear esoteric, even as a
benchmark, but the EU Treaty (the Amsterdam Agreement) on which the SGP is built in fact
expresses ambitions to pursue union wide objectives by means of close policy coordination (see,
for example, Article 99 of the Treaty). Moreover, coordination need not actually be conducted
in terms of maximizing some abstract agreed-upon objective function. Rather, it may consist of
an informal process of bargaining and compensatory side payments.1
To make the benchmark comparable with the EU and EMU scenarios analyzed below, we as-
sume that policy makers cannot commit. The benchmark therefore di®ers from the constrained
optimal outcome|the Ramsey allocation|which requires commitment. To simplify the expo-
sition, we con¯ne the analysis of the interaction between ¯scal and monetary authorities to a
single period. This is not very restrictive, since policy makers are allowed to \care" for state
variables at the end of the period. For example, policy makers may have preferences over the
stock of government debt at the end of the period to the extent that this debt a®ects future
policy options and, hence, the welfare of future taxpayers.
In a world where national economies are interconnected, national ¯scal or monetary policies
in°uence economic outcomes in other countries. We shall say that spillover e®ects arise if the
policy choices by one authority directly in°uence variables entering in the objective function of
other authorities. We will talk about policy mediated spillover e®ects, if the policy choices by
one authority indirectly, via induced policy responses by a third authority, in°uence variables
entering in the objective function of other authorities. In the benchmark case, all direct spillover
e®ects are fully internalized and, therefore, do not cause any deadweight losses, because all
1A prerequisite for gains from coordination to be exploitable is that authorities have some common perceptions
about how the world works; such (common) perceptions may not always be present, however.
3authorities agree on the joint objective function. By the envelope theorem, the same also holds
for policy mediated spillover e®ects.
2.2 EU: Decentralized Fiscal and Monetary Policies
We characterize the situation before the introduction of the common monetary policy as de-
centralized decision making by monetary and ¯scal authorities without commitment. The as-
sumption that ¯scal authorities cannot commit seems indisputable. After all, ¯scal policies are
at the core of political controversies and bargaining in national politics and hence, commitment
would largely be incompatible with democratic decision making. Our parallel assumption with
regard to central banks deserves further comment, however, given that central banks in the
pre EMU era seemed less inclined to implement expansionary policies than the respective ¯s-
cal authorities. But this does not imply that central banks were committed to decision rules.
Rather, it conforms well with the view that delegation of monetary policy to Rogo® (1985)-type
\conservative" central bankers (with limited commitment like any other o±cial) gave rise to the
observed behavior.
We assume that central banks move after ¯scal authorities, thereby capturing the notion that
central banks can adjust their instruments in a much more °exible fashion. This does not imply
that central banks are forced to straighten out the macroeconomic mess that might be left by
¯scal policy makers. Since there is no commitment, and since there will be \later" governments
and central banks around, central bankers rather have the last word in each period. In the light
of economic circumstances, including ¯scal policy, they have the freedom to determine in°ation
or exchange rates at their discretion.
Lack of Policy Coordination Optimal policy choices by a ¯scal policy maker maximize his
objective function, subject to the expected optimal policy choices by all other ¯scal authorities
and the expected policy responses by all national central banks. As a consequence, the incentive
structure of ¯scal policy makers in EU di®ers from the benchmark in two important respects; see
the respective ¯rst-order conditions (1) and (2) in the Appendix. First, policy makers in EU do
not internalize spillover e®ects. Second, when accounting for the welfare e®ects of their policy
choices on their own objectives, policy makers in EU do not only consider the direct e®ects,
but also the indirect e®ects due to induced policy changes by subsequently moving authorities.
Clearly, the source of the ¯rst di®erence, namely that policy makers do not take spillover e®ects
into account, is a con°ict of interests: Authorities maximize their individual objective functions
rather than a joint (supranational) objective function. The same con°ict of interests is at the
source of the second di®erence, namely that decision makers consider the responses to their own
actions by other authorities. For if incentives were fully aligned, authorities would not have to
worry about the induced policy responses by other policy makers.
With con°icting interests among policy makers, direct spillover e®ects are no longer inter-
nalized and, therefore, have social welfare implications. We distinguish between three types of
such consequences:
i. The general equilibrium e®ects of policy choices by each authority redistribute wealth
across households and countries. While such so-called pecuniary externalities do not create
4e±ciency losses, they might be problematic from a global welfare point of view, depending
on the distributional preferences.
ii. E±ciency losses due to general equilibrium e®ects do occur if authorities are non-atomistic
(a natural assumption) and exploit their market powers. With multiple non-atomistic
policy makers, this results in strategic interaction.2
iii. Finally, e±ciency losses due to general equilibrium e®ects may also occur as a result of
non-internalized aggregate demand externalities, if nominal prices or wages are sticky. The
consequences of these demand externalities are re°ected in output gaps and unemployment
rates.
The (non internalized) policy mediated spillover e®ects that arise if policy makers move sequen-
tially have parallel social welfare implications.
Evaluated by the joint objective function, policy choices in the benchmark implement an
allocation on the (second-best) Pareto frontier. Since the decentralized equilibrium must satisfy
additional incentive compatibility constraints, it must rank weakly lower than the benchmark
case, if evaluated according to this objective function. If, in contrast, the welfare comparison
between the two equilibria is based on the preferences of individual policy makers, the outcome
in EU must be weakly worse for at least one authority. In fact, all authorities may potentially
rank the decentralized equilibrium lower than the benchmark allocation, due to the deadweight
losses discussed above.
Domestic Policy Failure Up to this point, we have discussed problems arising due to the
di®erent policy objectives of authorities. Other complications may be characterized as agency
problems: Politicians do not always act in the best interest of society, in particular because the
electorate is not fully informed about the consequences of policy. These agency problems are
aggravated by the fact that di®erent citizens have con°icting interests, and politicians themselves
also have a limited knowledge about the functioning of the economy. As suggested by a large
literature on domestic ¯scal policy failure,3 ¯scal policy choices may therefore be ine±cient, even
in the absence of spillover e®ects and strategic interaction at the international level.
2.3 EMU: Decentralized Fiscal Policies, Centralized Monetary Policy
We characterize the situation after the introduction of EMU as decentralized decision making in
the ¯scal ¯eld, combined with centralized monetary policy (once more without commitment)|
with the newly established European Central Bank (ECB) replacing national central banks. In
the ¯rst stage, all national ¯scal authorities move simultaneously, while the ECB follows in the
second stage.
The economic environment under EMU di®ers threefold from the EU case. First, the ECB
pursues an objective function accounting for the e®ects on the whole EMU area, while national
2Dixit and Lambertini (2001) analyze the strategic interaction between a common central bank and national
¯scal authorities with di®erent in°ation and output bliss points.
3For surveys of the literature in this ¯eld see, for example, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) on political
business cycles and Alesina and Perotti (1995) or Persson and Tabellini (2000) on dynamic common-pool problems.
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policy instrument (the national interest rate or the exchange rate, depending on the design of
national monetary policy). Finally, the move from EU to EMU implies various structural changes
in the economies. Demand externalities become stronger, if the common currency fosters cross-
border market integration and, therefore, international interdependence. Pecuniary externalities
become more pronounced to the extent that a government's borrowing in Euro bonds more
strongly a®ects the interest rate of other national Euro debtors than when national capital
markets are segmented by national currencies. Pecuniary externalities also become stronger,
if unsophisticated investors do not properly di®erentiate between the default risk of di®erent
countries, as long as they issue their debt in Euros, thereby driving up the cost of funds for
more responsible governments.
Lack of Policy Coordination Optimal policy choices by a ¯scal policy maker now maximize
his objective function, subject to the optimal policy choices by all other ¯scal authorities and
the policy response by the ECB. As a consequence of the changed economic environment, the
incentive structure of ¯scal policy makers in EMU di®ers from the EU case in two respects; see
the respective ¯rst-order conditions (2) and (3) in the Appendix. First, since closer international
linkages increase the spillover e®ects across decision makers and countries, larger spillover e®ects
remain unaccounted for in EMU. Second, ¯scal policy makers anticipate induced policy responses
by the ECB rather than by domestic central banks, in particular their own one.
With respect to the ¯rst di®erence, the implications are straightforward. We previously
argued (in the discussion of the EU case) that spillover e®ects do not only have distributive
implications, but also cause deadweight losses if policy makers exploit their market powers or
if demand externalities are present. This suggests that the e±ciency costs of non-internalized
spillover e®ects are larger in EMU than in EU.
Turning to the second di®erence, the move from EU to EMU also changes the nature of
policy mediated spillover e®ects. These e®ects change character because policy responses by the
ECB to the developments in any member state have immediate implications for the monetary
conditions in the whole EMU area. Depending on to which ¯scal variables the ECB responds,
various policy mediated spillover e®ects may be present, giving rise to distorted ¯scal policy
choices (relative to the benchmark or EU) and deadweight losses along several dimensions.4 For
instance, ¯scal policy makers may be tempted to issue more Euro denominated debt, or even
debt in any denomination, than in the EU case. The reason is that they may anticipate the
ECB to soften its monetary policy stance in response, in order to depreciate the real value of the
outstanding debt, or to stimulate the economy that is depressed by high distorting taxes (to pay
for the debt service).5 In both cases, deadweight losses arise because individual governments do
not take the negative consequences of higher equilibrium in°ation in other countries into account.
If not only policy makers, but also investors, correctly anticipate the ECB's response, it has no
\real" e®ects, but simply results in an in°ationary bias similar to that analyzed by Barro and
4If the ECB responds to EMU wide averages of variables, it will react more strongly to policy choices by large
countries than by small countries. Taken by itself, this means that ¯scal policy makers in small countries are less
likely to internalize the e®ects of their policies on EMU-wide monetary conditions.
5See Chari and Kehoe (2004) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) for such arguments.
6Gordon (1983): Equilibrium in°ation is pushed to the level where the ECB is no longer willing
to further devalue outstanding debt or stimulate the economy at the cost of higher in°ation. As
a consequence, all ¯scal policy makers (and the ECB) end up being worse o®.
Another type of policy mediated spillover e®ect arises if the ECB is expected to act as
a lender of last resort and purchase public debt from the banking system, say, whenever the
prospect of an imminent sovereign default leads to a liquidity crisis.6 In that case, the ECB's
response has real e®ects since, e®ectively, part of the burden of the crisis country's public debt is
borne by other member states. As a consequence, a common-pool problem arises: Anticipating
the course of action, ¯scal authorities once more issue too much public debt and equilibrium
in°ation expectations rise, fuelled by the anticipation of a monetary bail out.
A ¯nal spillover e®ect may arise if the ECB responds to an EMU wide cost-push shock by
raising the interest rate. In this case, individual governments might have an incentive to increase
their budget de¯cit to mitigate the e®ects of the monetary contraction. Deadweight losses arise
because ¯scal policy makers do not take into account the negative consequences of the ECB's
response to their expansionary policy stance|even higher interest rates|on the objectives of
other ¯scal policy makers. In equilibrium, ¯scal policy in each country is expansionary, but
output remains depressed due to the ECB's contractionary policy stance.7
Domestic Policy Failure The move from EU to EMU also a®ects domestic ¯scal policy
failure. First, two watchdogs against policy failures|domestic central banks and international
foreign exchange markets|disappear. Second, the abolition of national central banks removes
possibilities for mitigating the costs of domestic policy failures, thereby encouraging responsi-
ble ¯scal policies. First consider the watchdog issue. Absent national monetary policy, ¯scal
authorities are freer to overheat or depress the economy, which might generate higher macroeco-
nomic volatility since periods of overheating must be followed by periods with restrictive policies.
Moreover, the role of ¯nancial markets as watchdogs on domestic ¯scal policies changes charac-
ter. In EU, market expectations of \irresponsible" ¯scal policies were rapidly re°ected in the
exchange rate, presumably because investors expected national monetary policies to accomodate
¯scal problems, with depreciation as a result. At the same time, the threat of such immediate
market responses on the foreign exchange market probably deterred some irresponsible policies
in the ¯rst place. In EMU, this threat no longer exists. With price reactions to ¯scal policy
choices now con¯ned to the bond market, the incentives for \responsible" ¯scal policies might
fall.
Turning to the second point, the abolishment of national central banks eliminates a domestic
lender of last resort with powers to in°ate away nominal government debt in times of crisis, for
instance when the debt level seriously threatens intergenerational equity objectives. Since the
ECB is less likely to intervene in response to a national crisis than a domestic central bank,
the move from EU to EMU might strengthen the incentives of national ¯scal policy makers
for prudent ¯scal policy choices. Similarly, the abolition of national monetary policies under
6See Uhlig (2002). He also discusses how the incentives for prudent bank regulation are a®ected when the
ECB becomes the lender of last resort.
7See Uhlig (2002). In contrast to most spillover e®ects proposed in the literature, this e®ect suggests a critical
role for de¯cits as opposed to government debt.
7EMU eliminates the option to devalue as a ¯nal escape route. This might also restrain govern-
ments (and unions) from pursuing in°ationary policies, since such policies have contractionary
(and thus unemployment creating) e®ects on the tradeable sector, if devaluations are no longer
feasible.8
The move from EU to EMU thus has various, and potentially opposing, consequences for
the extent of domestic policy failure and thus for macroeconomic stability and intergenerational
redistribution. The net e®ects are unclear from a theoretical point of view. Nor is the empirical
evidence conclusive. Fat¶ as and Mihov (2003) report signs of a \fatigue" in ¯scal consolidation
e®orts after the introduction of the common monetary policy in 1999. But whether this fatigue,
re°ected in laxer ¯scal policies, is related to changed strategic incentives or rather represents a
reaction to the preceding exceptional e®orts to qualify for EMU membership, remains unclear.
Summary How important are these potential problems in EMU? The prevalence and impor-
tance of domestic policy failure is widely acknowledged. In contrast, there is less consensus
on the importance of international repercussions of ¯scal policies, although it seems clear that
the move from EU to EMU most likely rendered these e®ects quantitatively more important.
The existence, and strength of these direct spillover e®ects is also crucial for the importance
of spillover e®ects transmitted by ¯scal policy responses. In contrast, it is not crucial for the
importance of spillover e®ects transmitted by monetary policy responses. These e®ects already
arise if the arguments of the ECB's objective function, e.g. average in°ation in the EMU area,
are a®ected by ¯scal policy choices. Clearly, an assessment of the importance of spillover e®ects
transmitted via monetary policy responses depends on one's view about the ECB's policy strat-
egy, in particular whether in°ation is the ECB's sole target variable, and whether the ECB is
fully committed. As emphasized, in our view, the ECB can neither commit, nor is it perfectly
insulated against political pressures to pursue objectives other than in°ation targeting. To the
extent that ¯scal policy makers exploit these features of central bank behavior, an in°ationary
bias or a dynamic common-pool problem might arise. Under the alternative assumption that
the ECB can actually commit, and is only concerned about in°ation, such an in°ationary bias
or dynamic common-pool problems cannot arise.
Regardless of whether international repercussions are quantitatively important, politicians
seem to have taken their existence seriously when conceiving of the SGP. A cynic might say that
their arguments were simply excuses for ambitions to keep certain countries, such as Italy or
Greece, outside of EMU|an attempt to keep the \bad apples out of the EMU basket." But this
argument triggers the question why policy makers wanted to block the access for these countries,
if not for the reason that they regarded international repercussions as important.
3 Corrective Mechanisms
We have identi¯ed two potential problems related to ¯scal policy choices in EMU, namely a lack
of policy coordination in the presence of spillover e®ects, and domestic policy failure. We now
8In those countries whose central banks in the EU strictly pegged their currencies to the D-Mark and therefore
had no °exibility in their monetary policy choices, the move from EU to EMU would tend to reduce the sensitivity
of monetary conditions to (¯scal) developments to a lesser extent.
8turn to the question of how these problems may be addressed.
3.1 Correcting for the Lack of Policy Coordination
Coordination The apparent solution to problems associated with a lack of international co-
ordination is, of course, to coordinate. In practice, however, coordination that is su±ciently
far-reaching to solve the problems associated with international economic dependencies is hardly
the optimal solution, since it creates a number of new problems. For once, far-reaching coordi-
nation by governments of di®erent countries might, in the presence of policy failures, turn into
coordination against citizens, a point made by Persson and Tabellini (1995) or, in the presence
of credibility problems of governments, into coordination against the ECB, a point made by
Giavazzi (2004). More generally, the substantial transfers of power to o±cials required for suc-
cessful coordination bear signi¯cant risks, in particular of abuse of power and of misjudgement
due to insu±cient information among decision makers (a Hayek-type argument). The obvious
way of minimizing these risks is to limit government intervention on the supra-national level
to those issues for which coordination is expected to be particularly bene¯cial. Such partial
coordination might be a more \robust" arrangement than far-reaching coordination, since it
limits the danger of large-scale political mistakes. Moreover, it is in better accord with visions
of decentralization of power, citizens' political participation, and political accountability.9
Corrective Taxation In principle, a system of elaborate Pigouvian taxes (plus transfers)
is an alternative to fully-°edged policy coordination.10 However, such an \ideal" Pigouvian
system is subject to the same type of problems as far-reaching coordination. The same robust-
ness argument would therefore point to a more limited Pigouvian system than the theoretical
benchmark.
Such a more limited Pigouvian system would tax (subsidize) those policy outcomes consid-
ered to be at the source of the most important spillover e®ects to other countries. What these
variables are, depends on the type of spillover. From the demand externality point of view, out-
put gaps (or unemployment rates) are particularly relevant, since they are connected to direct
spillover e®ects via trade. From the point of view of strategic interaction with the ECB, the
public debt quota is particularly relevant, since it increases the incentive for the ECB to loosen
its monetary policy stance, as discussed earlier. The output gap or the de¯cit quota may also be
relevant tax bases, to the extent that negative output gaps or positive de¯cit quotas may trigger
contractionary monetary policy responses by the ECB that a®ect all member countries. Finally,
from a cross-country redistribution point of view, output gaps and public debt are particularly
relevant, the latter since it a®ects the cost of the debt service across countries.11 To the extent
9This argument is di®erent from the \subsidiarity principle", according to which centralization is acceptable
only if it yields better solutions to the problems at hand. Our point rather relates to the trade-o® between
gains from coordination and the loss of other values, such as decentralization of power and national political
accountability.
10By Pigouvian taxes, we mean marginal taxes (subsidies) of the same size as marginal negative (positive)
externalities.
11Taxes on a country's debt quota might appear problematic, due to large variations in the debt quota across
countries, and di±culties in a®ecting the quota within a reasonably short time. Nevertheless, the debt quota
should be taxed if considered to be an important source of spillover e®ects. At the same time, countries with
9that some of these variables, for instance unemployment rates and output gaps, are notoriously
di±cult to measure, indicators such as in°ationary tendencies in product and factor markets
might also be relevant variables. Theoretically, taxes on these various \source" variables are
equivalent to (sets of) taxes on other variables closely linked to the sources. However, these
links are not always well understood, nor are they likely to be reasonably stable over time.
A robustness argument therefore implies that the Pigouvian taxes should apply as directly as
possible to the targeted sources of the most important spillovers.
The tax rates imposed under this limited Pigouvian system would re°ect the external social
marginal costs of the implemented policies, inducing governments to internalize the spillover
e®ects of their actions without forcing particular values of the taxed variables upon them. While
the tax rates would depend on economic circumstances, including the wealth distribution across
countries, they would not be directly related to the level of the taxed variable in a given country.12
Clearly, the purpose of this arrangement is to allocate the resulting debt and de¯cit quotas,
output gaps, or other sources of spillovers to those countries where their social value is highest
(or the social cost is lowest). Since the system would generally result in an unbalanced budget
of the Pigouvian program, the surplus or de¯cit could be distributed among member countries.
There is a close parallel between a Pigouvian tax system and a system based on markets
where governments can trade permits assigning the right to conduct policies resulting in spillover
e®ects. In such a system, the total amount of permits is ¯xed by the supra-national authority,
and each country obtains an initial endowment of permits. Trading of permits then takes
place, and market prices adjust to equilibrate the demand and supply for the permits. The
resulting equilibrium allocation is identical to the allocation under the Pigouvian tax system, if
both systems generate the same incentive and wealth e®ects, i.e. if (i) the Pigouvian tax rates
are identical to the market clearing prices and (ii) each country's net tax payments under the
Pigouvian system are identical to its net expenditure on permits under the tradeable permit
system.
Operational Corrective Taxation Since tax rates (in the Pigouvian system) or market
clearing prices (in the tradeable permits system) need to re°ect the external social marginal
costs of policy outcomes, the determination of the tax rates or the number of permits, and
the distribution of tax revenue or initial endowments of permits, requires that a complex op-
timization problem be solved. In reality, this is hardly feasible (in an uncontroversial way).
In practice, tax rates or permit quantities, as well as the distribution of tax revenue or initial
permit endowments, must therefore be determined in a more ad-hoc fashion, possibly by a trial-
an-error process. One drastic simpli¯cation would be to impose the same Pigouvian tax rate on
a particular variable in all countries.13 In the tradeable permits case, this would correspond to a
single (multilateral) rather than many bilateral markets for permits on that particular variable.
This approach would be particularly natural, if demand externalities and problems of strategic
high debt quotas could, however, receive lump sum transfers. In this way, the income e®ects of the tax could be
neutralized without forgoing the desired incentive e®ects.
12This implies, for example, that a country with a very high budget de¯cit may still pay zero corrective taxes,
provided that the social marginal cost of de¯cits is deemed to be negligible and the tax rates are thus set to zero.
13Such an outcome would also be expected for political reasons. Political factors render it very di±cult to
di®erentiate institutional constraints across countries.
10interaction are considered to arise in proportion to the EMU average of particular variables|as
might be a reasonable approximation in the case of demand externalities arising from output
gaps, and an even more reasonable approximation in the case of the e®ects working via policy
responses of the ECB. Another simpli¯cation concerns the distribution of the surpluses of Pigou-
vian programs or, alternatively, of the initial endowments of tradeable permits. For instance,
such distributions might be proportional to the GDP of each country.
While a Pigouvian tax system is theoretically equivalent to a tradeable permits system (even
in the ad-hoc forms), the former is likely to be more operational than the latter. The reason
is that, due to informational and other limitations, many of the variables to be a®ected by
the systems are in reality not fully under government control. Take, for example, the case of
permits for de¯cits, as suggested by Casella (1999). Since governments only have imperfect
control over the size of their de¯cits during a given ¯scal year (and indeed do not know the
exact outcome until after the end of that year), they may have incentives to either accumulate
excessive permits for precautionary reasons, or take the risk of ending a period with fewer permits
than required. To address the latter point, the system might be extended to allow for ex post
markets for permits, or intertemporal trade in de¯cits. This, in turn, would require additional
safeguards, for example progressive fees as suggested by Casella, to avoid that governments
exploit the option of intertemporally substituting permits. Otherwise, the intended in°uence
over contemporaneous de¯cits would easily be lost. Another problem with the permit solution
is that large countries like Germany may act oligopolistically in the market for permits. These
problems could be avoided under a system of Pigouvian taxes, since the regulating authority
does not lose direct control over the price/tax on the activity to be regulated in such a system.
The SGP may, in fact, be characterized as a form of corrective tax system, if ¯nes in connec-
tion with violations of the SGP are interpreted as taxes meant to increase the costs of certain
actions rather than completely deter them. However, the SGP constitutes a very crude ap-
proximation to an operational Pigouvian tax system, because of three signi¯cant shortcomings.
First, the Pact is only tied to one variable, namely the de¯cit, which is unlikely to be the only,
or even the most important, variable in the context of international spillover e®ects. Second,
the Pact's incentive structure is asymmetric because surpluses are not rewarded.14 Third, the
incentive structure is also discontinuous, since it imposes zero marginal costs of de¯cits except
at some speci¯c de¯cit quotas, starting with three percent. Asymmetry and discontinuity, in
turn, imply that the SGP does not lead to an equalization of the marginal costs and bene¯ts of
de¯cit reduction across countries.
The background for choosing such a crude approximation to a Pigouvian tax system is most
likely a legalistic view, where ¯nes are seen as punishments, designed to deter the violation
of rules. According to this view, it is \more natural" to forbid certain actions and punish
violations than to in°uence behavior via the price system. Another reason for not choosing
corrective taxes might be that they are believed to interfer too strongly with national policies.
Neither view is convincing|the ¯rst because it neglects the e±ciency losses due to discrepancies
between marginal costs and bene¯ts of adjustments in policy, the second because it is far from
obvious that taxes more severely restrain national autonomy than ¯xed rules such as the SGP.
14To the extent that ¯nes are refunded to countries that did not violate the constraints, there is some weak
form of symmetry.
113.2 Correcting Domestic Policy Failure
Transparency Since asymmetric information between politicians and the electorate is at the
heart of domestic policy failure, enhancing transparency and information is a natural way of
addressing the latter. Suggestions along these lines, in particular to create a \Sustainability
Council for EMU", have recently been made by Fat¶ as, Hughes Hallett, Sibert, Strauch and von
Hagen (2003).15 Such reforms may turn out not to be su±cient, however. Therefore, we discuss
additional potentially useful devices.
Corrective Taxation Policy failure can be interpreted as a form of externality from politi-
cian's actions on society at large. This suggests Pigouvian taxation as the optimal corrective
approach, in parallel to our previous reasoning on how to deal with international spillovers.
In contrast to the case of spillovers, however, Pigouvian taxes should now be paid by politi-
cians rather than countries. As this is clearly not feasible, a second-best solution may be that
countries instead pay Pigouvian taxes to an international authority, so as to indirectly in°u-
ence politicians' behavior. Naturally, this approach requires that politicians are not indi®erent
about the e®ect of the corrective tax on the government's budget. For example, if the policy
failure is re°ected in a tendency of governments to incur too large budget de¯cits, then de¯cits
could be taxed, thereby increasing the marginal e®ect of government spending on the de¯cit. If
politicians care at least to some extent about government de¯cits (albeit not su±ciently from
society's point of view), the tax would make it more costly to \buy votes" via de¯cit spending
and thus, discourage such spending.
As shown by the example of a tax on de¯cits, Pigouvian taxes that are designed to mitigate
international spillover e®ects may to some extent also help mitigate domestic policy failure, in
the sense of tending to \work in the right direction" also for the latter problem. In general,
however, international spillover e®ects and domestic policy failure will require di®erent corrective
taxes.
Rules Another approach is to impose rules directly constraining politicians' behavior. These
rules could either be of a procedural type, for example strengthening the powers of parliamentary
budget committees or the treasury; or they could constrain ¯scal policy instruments or outcomes,
for example by imposing ceilings on expenditure levels or budget de¯cits.16
In the presence of a spending or de¯cit bias, there is a clear case for procedural rules.
Constraints on policy instruments or outcomes, in contrast, are more problematic. Although
expenditure ceilings tend to strengthen the powers of the treasury relative to the spending
departments, which might be useful, such constraints can easily be circumvented by creative
book keeping or by switching from transfers to tax concessions. More importantly, constraints
on ¯scal instruments or outcomes impinge on the possibility to use ¯scal policy in a °exible
manner, which could create serious costs for society. To minimize the corresponding cost-bene¯t
15The task of the Council would be to report its assessment of the member states' ¯scal policies to the public
and the European Parliament.
16For instance, the Swedish budget process includes expenditure ceilings. In the U.S., the congressional bud-
get committee holds particularly strong powers. In the U.K., the government has adopted principles of ¯scal
management which are enshrined in a \Code for Fiscal Stability."
12ratio, it is important that the rules constrain the most appropriate variables, and in the most
e±cient way.
As argued by many authors, the constraints embodied in the SGP are unlikely to satisfy this
e±ciency requirement. One reason is that the constraints might prevent the automatic stabilizers
from working in the most desirable fashion. They might also crowd out public investment,
prevent tax smoothing or stabilizing discretionary demand management policies or, indeed,
induce a ¯scal contraction in the midst of a recession by the requirement to reduce de¯cits
or the debt quota.17 Other de¯ciencies of the SGP are that it embodies asymmetric incentives
(since it does not give incentives to behave \well" as opposed to avoiding \bad" behavior); that it
only considers government debt, not assets; and that it does not account for implicit government
debt such as social security obligations.18 The European Commission has acknowledged some
of these problems and suggested a more discretionary approach in the implementation of the
SGP (Commission of the European Communities, 2004).
Many proposed reforms of the SGP respond to these criticisms by suggestions to tie the Pact's
constraints to alternative de¯cit measures, or using combined measures of the government's
¯nancial position. In particular, some proposals argue in favor of constraining the cyclically
adjusted de¯cit or the average budget de¯cit over the business cycle. Alternative proposals are
to allow countries with smaller debt quotas to run larger de¯cit quotas (European Economic
Advisory Group, 2003; Commission of the European Communities, 2004), or to allow countries
to run (larger) de¯cits, only if they recorded su±ciently high surpluses during the last few
preceding years.19 All alternatives but the ¯rst would presumably need some amendments. If
governments do indeed procrastinate or, alternatively, expect to be replaced, constraints on
medium-run or accumulated budget de¯cits would not prevent governments from running too
small surpluses in \good" times. By forcing subsequent governments to pursue restrictive ¯scal
policies even during a recession, a medium-run de¯cit constraint may therefore come in con°ict
with ambitions to stabilize the economy. Requiring governments to run budget surpluses during
booms might help avoid this problem.
To reduce the risk that the SGP may crowd out government investment, Blanchard and Gi-
avazzi (2003) have argued that there is a case for constraining de¯cits net of public investment.
This proposal has several advantages: First, government investment often gives rise to future
¯nancial returns, for example in the case of investment in energy production. In that case,
increased government debt does not accurately re°ect the change in the government's wealth
17See, for example, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993), European Economic
Advisory Group (2003), or Fat¶ as and Mihov (2003) for discussions. Naturally, these arguments assume, that ¯scal
stabilization policy is, on balance, useful. While there is a broad consensus on this issue with respect to automatic
stabilizers, there is controversy on whether discretionary ¯scal policy also contributes to macroeconomic stability.
The latter is probably true in extreme recessions or booms, while experience suggests that ¯ne-tuning of the
business cycle is rather hazardous. See also European Economic Advisory Group (2003) for a discussion of ¯scal
stabilization policy.
18The notion of generational accounting is designed to incorporate the two latter considerations, see Auerbach
and Kotliko® (1987). Another problem with the SGP relates to the improper treatment of in°ation: The nominal
de¯cit, divided by the price level overstates the real de¯cit since it neglects the in°ation induced depreciation of
real government debt.
19In contrast to the proposal by the European Economic Advisory Group (2003) to condition the de¯cit con-
straint on the level of debt, the latter proposal implies that ¯scal policy is not constrained by budgetary decisions
in the distant past.
13position, and de¯cits do not necessarily point to any policy failure. More generally, allowing
governments to ¯nance productive public investment by bond issues does not induce contem-
porary voters to neglect the welfare of future generations, but rather the opposite.20 Second, if
the central aspect of domestic policy failure is a bias of government spending in favor of current
as opposed to capital spending, the Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) proposal helps mitigate that
bias, although only partially since, for example, investment in human capital does not enter in
the capital account. Finally, the proposed adjustment would not require any changes in the
Treaty underlying the SGP, making it easier to implement.
Delegation of Authority Delegation of authority constitutes an alternative to rules that
reduces the con°ict between policy °exibility and ambitions to counteract policy failures. Such
delegation allows for °exibility, because all available information can be accounted for at the
time decisions are taken, in contrast to the case of rigid rules. This is achieved without sacri-
¯cing ambitions to counteract policy failures, as long as the agents in charge face appropriate
incentives.
Delegation of monetary policy to a Rogo® (1985)-type conservative central banker has not
only helped mitigate problems of time-inconsistency, but also remove the in°uence of party
politics in national monetary policy. In a parallel fashion, delegation of ¯scal policy might reduce
the extent of policy failure. In particular, delegation of ¯scal policy might mitigate the risks of
pronounced political business cycles and counteract tendencies to \unsustainable" policies, i.e.,
policies drastically redistributing wealth from future to current generations. In spite of these
similarities, the delegation of ¯scal policy is necessarily quite a di®erent matter than delegation
of monetary policy. Naturally, the reason is that one fundamental purpose of ¯scal policy is to
allocate resources and distribute income in accordance with voters' preferences. In other words,
¯scal policy is at the core of the democratic process, to a much larger extent than monetary
policy. This implies that the possibility of delegation to agencies outside the political sphere is
much more limited for ¯scal policy than for monetary policy. Delegation of the latter generally
involves a hand-over of all relevant instruments to an administratively independent central bank
(although governments have prescribed the general policy targets and, in some countries, even
the numerical target such as a certain rate of in°ation). Delegation of ¯scal policy cannot go
that far, but it can go some way.21
A very limited type of ¯scal policy delegation would be to create a ¯scal policy committee
forecasting the budget outlook (similar to the Congressional Budget O±ce in the U.S.)22, or
o±cially recommending the general ¯scal stance, for instance regarding the size of the budget
de¯cit. A much more far-reaching proposal is to oblige the government to follow these rec-
ommendations. Wyplosz (2002), for example, argues that ¯scal policy committees should be
given an explicit mandate of ensuring debt sustainability, and powers to limit annual government
de¯cits by law. Similarly far-reaching is the proposal to allow ¯scal policy committees to directly
implement their desired de¯cit targets. This could be achieved by delegating the power to scale
tax rates and/or spending levels up or down from their politically determined base values (see
20See Bassetto and Sargent (2004) for a formal analysis of this point.
21See also the discussion in European Economic Advisory Group (2003).
22See the recent proposal by Jonung and Larch (2004).
14the discussion in European Economic Advisory Group, 2003). In the special case where the same
scaling factor applies to all taxes and all types of government spending, politicians would largely
retain control over the structure of taxation, subsidies, and government spending, and thus the
control over Musgrave's (1959) distribution and allocation branches of ¯scal policy. Control over
the macroeconomic stabilization branch, in contrast, would be handed over to the ¯scal policy
committee. Whatever form such partial delegation of ¯scal policy may take, the members of
¯scal policy committees would in any case have to be accountable to political authorities|in
the same way as operationally independent central banks.
Nationally or Supranationally Imposed Measures? As mentioned before, corrective tax-
ation applied to governments rather than politicians requires some international arrangement
to determine, collect and potentially redistribute the proceeds from these taxes. In contrast,
other measures to correct domestic policy failure do not necessarily require any international
involvement; for rules, delegation of authority, or measures to improve transparency can, in
principle, be implemented by domestic legislation. To give these measures any \bite", however,
they must be di±cult to reverse, i.e., they need to be enacted on a \constitutional" level. If
this is not possible because national policy failure extends to the constitutional level, then inter-
nationally imposed constraints may play a substitute role as credible self-disciplinary devices.
Like the GATT, WTO, and many other international agreements, the SGP may be regarded as
such a re°ection of policy makers' willingness to tie their own hands in ¯scal policy matters by
internationally agreed rules. In that view, the launch of EMU o®ered a \window of opportu-
nity" to impose the SGP as an external commitment mechanism (European Economic Advisory
Group, 2003), and let EMU-wide institutions serve as a \¯scal backbone" for countries with
weak institutions (Buiter et al., 1993).23 24
With regard to delegation of authority, constitutional failure gives rise to two distinct di-
mensions along which supranational involvement might be bene¯cial: Not only might delegation
be imposed by a supranational arrangement, but countries may also choose to delegate ¯scal
policy decisions to supranational bodies. It is tempting to argue that such delegation is politi-
cally infeasible, because of the implied loss of national sovereignty. However, rigid international
rules, such as the SGP, also imply a loss of sovereignty, and it is not clear which type of loss is
more severe. Indeed, some international delegation of economic powers already exists today, for
example to the IMF or the WTO, not to speak of the EU itself.
23Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) propose a di®erent explanation for the link between EMU and the SGP. They argue
that the common currency is a prerequisite to render the enforcement of ¯scal rules of the kind implemented in
the SGP time consistent. According to Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), countries have incentives to enforce de¯cit
constraints on other countries, only if they are harmed by de¯cits in those countries which they argue to be the
case under a common currency.
24The extent of domestic constitutional failure and thus, the need for supranational involvement, presum-
ably varies between countries. According to Eichengreen (2004), the|internationally imposed|SGP constraints
should therefore only apply to those countries that are unable to pursue sound ¯scal policies on their own (as
judged by an independent expert committee). Eichengreen (2004) proposes three measures of sustainability: the
presence of \appropriate ¯scal institutions", \limited future pension liabilities", and °exible labor markets.
153.3 Enforcement
Courts Nationally or supranationally imposed constraints on budget policies will not be e®ec-
tive in the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms triggering sanctions in case of violations
of the constraints. Courts can usually not provide such enforcement because they lack the au-
thority. Enforcement must thus rely on other mechanisms, such as norms and the threat of
exclusion from membership in the supranational organization.
Norms Social norms (in society at large or in one's peer group) and internalized norms work
through utility losses for the violators, either in terms of reduced status (in the case of so-
cial norms) or bad conscience (in the case of internalized norms). For instance, politicians in
government might want to avoid being considered an \outcast" and thus feel obliged to obey
supranationally imposed constraints. If the general public is su±ciently anxious that constraints
be obeyed, the in°uence of social norms may be accentuated by the threat of publicity of a viola-
tion. This observation points to a potentially important role played by the media and prestigious
authorities such as an international court. The proposal by Fat¶ as et al. (2003) to create a \Sus-
tainability Council for EMU" with the task of reporting its assessment of the ¯scal policies
of member states to the public and the European Parliament builds on exactly this notion of
discouragement of \rule" violations via public awareness and pressure. Similarly, the European
Commission has emphasized the role of peer pressure to enforce the SGP (Commission of the
European Communities, 2004).
Exclusion from Membership If the general public is not su±ciently interested in a govern-
ment's conduct, or if the public actually encourages a government to violate a constraint, then
social norms lose their force. In that case, the necessary pressure must come from other coun-
tries. Ultimately, then, it is the threat to be excluded from the bene¯ts of membership that can
enforce obedience to the constraint. Whether this threat of exclusion is powerful depends on two
factors. First, it depends on a government's net bene¯ts from membership. Since these bene¯ts
are greater if the institutional constraints are e±cient (i.e., characterized by minimum costs to
the national economies), such e±cient constraints are likely to be easier to enforce. Second, the
power of the threat of exclusion depends on its credibility, and thus on other governments' net
bene¯ts of \keeping the violator in the club."
Fines versus Taxes From an economic-theory point of view, a ¯ne is equivalent to a dis-
continuous tax function. From a legalistic point of view, in contrast, ¯nes di®er from taxes
because only the former represent punishments of violations of rules. To the extent that the
general public holds a legalistic view, the violation of a constraint and the related payment of
a ¯ne spurs much larger publicity|both nationally and internationally|than the payment of
(corrective) taxes. This is the case, even if the tax payments have the same size as the ¯ne. As
a consequence, the violation of a constraint and the payment of a ¯ne will be associated with
considerable more \political drama" than the payment of a corrective tax. Since such political
drama is very costly for the politicians involved, a government is likely to ¯ght tooth and nail
to avoid a formal punishment procedure, not least by manipulating the statistics. In e®ect,
16then, ¯nes are rarely levied in equilibrium, and the constraint loses its credibility because weak
ex-post incentives undermine apparently strong ex-ante incentives. Indeed, this seems to be the
situation with the SGP in 2003 and 2004.25
The political drama associated with ¯nes is accentuated by their abruptness, i.e., the fact
that a small change in the constrained variable triggers a large punishment. Such abruptness is
likely to be regarded as unreasonable or unfair by the country concerned and its government.
Moreover, demands by such a government to be exempt from punishment are likely to ¯nd
support with other governments expecting to be in a similar situation in the future. With a
smooth tax function, such problems may not arise to the same extent. A tax gradually increasing
in the tax base therefore mitigates two problems associated with the enforcement of SGP-type
constraints, one related to the perception of ¯nes as punishments, the other to the abrupt
consequences of violations.
4 Conclusions
Proposals for reform of the SGP must start from an assessment of the problems it is supposed to
solve. We have concentrated on two sets of such problems: international spillover e®ects, in par-
ticular through demand externalities, strategic interaction among policy makers, and pecuniary
externalities; and domestic policy failures.
The SGP addresses these problems from a legalistic point of view. This is the background
to the in°exibility of the rules embodied in the Pact. An economic-theory perspective on con-
straining economic policy instead emphasizes the importance of °exibility in the light of varying
circumstances.
If the basic purpose of institutional constraints is to keep spillover e®ects in check, then
corrective taxes on variables associated with these spillovers constitute the theoretically most
appealing response. Tradeable permits for such variables are an alternative. Assuming the
severity of the spillover e®ects to depend on the EU-averages of the source variables, uniform
corrective taxes across countries, or multilateral markets for tradeable permits, su±ce for an e±-
cient arrangement. Naturally, a system of Pigouvian taxes or, to an even larger extent, tradeable
permits, could only be implemented in a rough, less than ideal manner, due to informational
limitations and various imperfections in the political process. But even in a less than ideal form,
such an arrangement would signi¯cantly dominate the SGP as well as many proposed reforms
of the Pact, for at least two reasons. First, it could account for all important spillovers. The
latter do not only, or even mainly, occur via national budget de¯cits but also via output gaps
(alternatively unemployment rates), in°ationary pressure, and the stock of public debt. Sec-
ond, it could more e±ciently regulate these spillovers, due to the symmetry and continuity of
the incentive structure induced by Pigouvian taxes, which leads to an equalization of costs and
bene¯ts of spillover reductions across countries.
If instead the basic purpose of institutional constraints is to correct domestic ¯scal policy
failures, then increased transparency and corrective taxes paid by politicians constitute the nat-
ural responses. Corrective taxes paid by countries, in contrast, only o®er limited bene¯ts. Rules
25Alternatively, an arrangement built on rewards for non-violators as opposed to ¯nes for violators might also
mitigate the political drama. Naturally, this would require that more revenue is raised or other expenditures cut.
17in the legalistic tradition make it possible to directly constrain politicians' behavior, but imply
a loss of policy °exibility. The rigid rules embodied in the SGP, in particular, impose unnec-
essarily tight restrictions, not least because they constrain an inappropriate variable. Several
proposed reforms of the SGP imply some improvements in that respect, allowing for more pro-
nounced countercyclical ¯scal policies, including less restricted operation of the automatic ¯scal
stabilizers. But they do not resolve the fundamental con°ict between policy °exibility and the
ambition to counteract policy failures. Limited delegation of ¯scal powers to fully accountable
committees o®ers a conceivable solution to this con°ict. A priori, there is no theoretical pre-
sumption for internationally imposed measures to correct domestic policy failures. However,
such internationally imposed measures might be in a country's best interest, if domestic policy
failure extends to the constitutional level.
If the motivations underlying the SGP relate to cross-country spillovers, so that major re-
forms to the SGP are necessary, transition problems arise. A ¯rst step in the reform process
could then be to stick to the current 3% and 60% targets for a while, but to interpret them as
reference values at the center of broader intervals, with smooth punishment and reward schemes
as approximations to a (Pigouvian) tax system de¯ned over these intervals. Taking some of
the strain from the current arrangement, this transitional measure would buy policy makers the
necessary time to devise a more appropriate corrective tax system.
To be e®ective, institutional constraints must be enforceable. In the absence of a powerful
international court, such enforcement of supranationally imposed constraints largely rests on
social norms and the threat of exclusion from the organization. The latter threat is more
powerful if governments perceive the continuation value of a given arrangement to be high.
The force of social norms, in turn, strongly depends on public opinion and thus, the general
public's anxiety, potentially fostered by the media, that institutional constraints be obeyed.
Since political drama renders enforcement more di±cult, tax-subsidy programs are likely to
dominate SGP-type rigid rules also with regards to their enforceability: taxes are better than
¯nes.
18A Appendix
A.1 Benchmark: Perfect Policy Coordination
Let the vector of all policy instruments be denoted by ¼, and let x represent the vector of
all policy relevant variables, i.e. the variables entering the objective function of at least one
¯scal or monetary authority. We represent the equilibrium relationship between these variables
and the policy instruments, ¼, as well as household expectations about the instruments, ¼e,
in reduced form as x = F(¼;¼e). The objective functions of the authorities are given by
Ui(x), where i = 1;:::;N denotes ¯scal authorities and i = N + 1;:::;2N denotes monetary
authorities; in particular, i = N + 1 stands for the Bundesbank. If policy choices are fully
coordinated, welfare e®ects are evaluated according to an agreed-upon social welfare function,
U(x) ´ V (U1(x);U2(x);:::;U2N(x)), with V (¢) non-decreasing in all its arguments.
A strategy of a player speci¯es the player's action at each information set. Since the private
sector and the policy makers only move once in our setup, the strategies depend on the history
of actions taken by previous players. In particular, the optimal coordinated strategy of policy
makers simply amounts to an optimal response to household expectations:26
¹ ¼?(¹ ¼e):
The subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by
¹ ¼e? = ¹ ¼?(¢);
¹ ¼? = argmax
¹ ¼ U(F(¹ ¼; ¹ ¼e?)):
According to the ¯rst equation, optimal household expectations are equal to the optimal policy
choices. (When omitting the argument of a strategy, we imply that the strategy is evaluated at
optimal actions; in the present case, the strategy of policy makers is evaluated at the optimal
action of households, i.e. their rational expectations about policy.) According to the second
equation, optimal policy choices maximize the agreed-upon social welfare function conditional
on rational household expectations. Alternatively formulated, in terms of ¯rst-order conditions,
the optimal policy choices are characterized by27
dU(¹ x)
dx











dF(¹ ¼?; ¹ ¼e?)
d¹ ¼
= 0: (1)
The terms (dUi(x)=dx)(dF(¢)=d¹ ¼) in (1) represent the marginal e®ects of changes in policy
on the objective functions of authority i = 1;:::;2N. We refer to these e®ects as spillover
e®ects on authority i, whenever the relevant element of ¼ is not under the direct control of that
authority, i.e. whenever the policy choice by one authority a®ects the objective of another. In
the benchmark case, these spillover e®ects do not cause deadweight losses, since they are fully
internalized due to agreement among all authorities about the overall social welfare measure
V (¢).
26In the following, a bar denotes variables or functions in the benchmark case.
27Throughout the analysis, we assume equilibria to be unique, di®erentiable, and interior. Derivatives of F(¢)
with respect to policy instruments are matrix valued; derivatives of the Ui(¢) functions with respect to x are vector
valued; and derivatives of V (¢) with respect to Ui(¢) are scalars. For notational simplicity, we do not explicitly
distinguish between scalars, vectors, and matrices.
19A.2 EU: Decentralized Fiscal and Monetary Policies
When analyzing policies in EU, we can either consider all EU countries or restrict the analysis
to the ERM countries. We start with the latter case and model the Bundesbank's leading role
in ERM by letting the Bundesbank move before the other national central banks. Let the vector
of all policy instruments, ¼, be partitioned into the policy instruments of the ¯scal authorities,
¿, the policy instruments of the Bundesbank, ½, and the policy instruments of all other central
banks, ¾. The optimal strategy of ¯scal authority i, the Bundesbank, and central bank j,
respectively, can be represented by functions
¿?
i (¼e); ½?(¼e;¿) and ¾?
j(¼e;¿;½); i = 1;:::;N; j = N + 2;:::;2N:














¡j(¢);¼e?)); j = N + 2;:::;2N;
where strategies are once more evaluated at optimal actions. According to the ¯rst equation,
optimal household expectations are equal to the optimal policy choices. According to the second
equation, optimal ¯scal policy choices by authority i maximize the objective function of i,
subject to the optimal policy choices by all other ¯scal authorities (the strategies of all other
¯scal authorities, denoted by ¿?
¡i(¢), evaluated at rational household expectations), and the
optimal monetary policy responses (evaluated at optimal household expectations and ¯scal policy
choices). The third and fourth conditions similarly de¯ne optimal monetary policy choices.
Alternatively, the subgame perfect policy choices by ¯scal authority i, the Bundesbank, and

































































= 0; j = N + 2;:::;2N;
where the strategies and the mapping F(¢) are evaluated at optimal actions. According to (2),
decision makers in EU account both for the direct e®ects of their choice of policy instruments
20on their own objectives and the indirect e®ects due to the anticipated policy responses of other
authorities to their actions. In the case of ¯scal policy makers, these policy responses consist of
the feedback from the Bundesbank and the subsequent feedbacks from the other central banks
(the terms subsumed under Ai). In the case of the Bundesbank, the policy responses consist of
the feedbacks from the other central banks (the terms subsumed under AN+1).
If considering the EU as a whole, we might want to relax the assumption that the Bundesbank
has a leading role since, for instance, the Bank of England has also been in°uential within EU.





























= 0; j = N + 1;:::;2N;
where the strategies and the mapping F(¢) are evaluated at optimal actions, and the Bun-
desbank's optimal strategy is denoted by ¾?
N+1(¢). With two rather than three stages in this
modi¯ed game among authorities, the central banks play Nash rather than Stackelberg as in the
case of the Bundesbank moving before the other central banks.
A comparison of the optimality conditions of policy making in the benchmark and EU, (1)
and (2), respectively, reveals that spillover e®ects are no longer internalized in EU. Moreover,
policy makers in EU take the policy feedback e®ects on their own objectives (the A terms) into
account. The source of this second di®erence is con°icting interests among policy makers. To see
this, consider the ¯rst-order conditions characterizing an equilibrium with non-atomistic policy
makers that move in the same order as in the EU case and cause the same spillover e®ects, but

































































= 0; j = N + 2;:::;2N:
The last condition implies that (dU(x)=dx) ¹ AN+1 = 0, and therefore (dU(x)=dx)(dF(¢)=d¹ ½) = 0.
This, in turn, implies that (dU(x)=dx) ¹ Ai = 0, and therefore, (dU(x)=dx)(dF(¢)=d¹ ¿i) = 0.
21Absent con°icting interests, the A terms in (2) would therefore be irrelevant since dU(x)=dx¢A
would be equal to zero. Intuitively, as long as authorities share the same objective function V (¢),
they do not have to worry about the induced policy responses by other authorities, because
the incentives are fully aligned, regardless of whether the authorities move simultaneously or
sequentially.
A.3 EMU: Decentralized Fiscal Policies, Centralized Monetary Policy
Naturally, in EMU, all national monetary policy instruments disappear. Let (^ ¿; ^ ½) denote the
vectors of policy instruments of all ¯scal authorities and the ECB, respectively, subject to the
constraint that (default-risk adjusted) nominal interest rates are equalized across countries. Let
U0(x) denote the objective function of the ECB. Optimal strategies of ¯scal authority i and the
ECB, respectively, are now given by28
^ ¿?
i (^ ¼e) and ^ ½?(^ ¼e; ^ ¿); i = 1;:::;N:
The subgame perfect equilibrium satis¯es





¡i(¢); ^ ¿i; ^ ½?(¢); ^ ¼e?)); i = 1;:::;N;
^ ½? = argmax
^ ½
U0(F(^ ¿?(¢); ^ ½; ^ ¼e?));
where strategies are once more evaluated at optimal actions. According to the ¯rst equation,
optimal household expectations are equal to the optimal policy choices by ¯scal authorities
and the ECB. According to the second equation, optimal ¯scal policy choices by authority i
maximize the objective function of i, subject to the optimal policy choices by all other ¯scal
authorities and the optimal policy response by the ECB. According to the last condition, the
ECB maximizes its objective function, conditional on given household expectations and ¯scal
policy choices. In terms of ¯rst-order conditions, the subgame perfect policy choices by ¯scal
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= 0; i = 1;:::;N;
dU0(^ x)
dx
d ^ F(^ ¼?; ^ ¼e?)
d^ ½
= 0; (3)
where strategies and the mapping from policies and expectations into the allocation are once
more evaluated at optimal actions. Note that we have replaced the earlier mapping F(¢) by
^ F(¢) to represent structural changes in the economies following the move to EMU. As argued in
the main text, these structural changes are likely to increase the interdependencies among, and
hence spillover e®ects across, countries.
28In the following, a hat denotes variables and functions in the EMU case.
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